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I. INTRODUCTION
The need to balance developmental and environmental issues globally
has become acute due to the issue of climate change. As negotiations on
the future of the international climate regime languish and countries have
difficulties agreeing on a balance, international law, and specifically
international dispute resolution, may be able to provide some guidance.
According to international environmental law, states have a responsibility to
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause
damage to the environment of other states, or to areas beyond the limits
of their national jurisdiction.1 This principle was applied in a 1935
arbitration2 to find a balance between cross border pollution damage in
one country and industrial development rights in another. More recently
in 1997, in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case,3 though obiter dicta, the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) confirmed the principle but found
that the environmental damage claimed by Hungary did not rise to the
level of a peremptory norm to act as a defense to terminate the contractual
agreements to build a hydroelectric power system under the treaty between
Hungary and Slovakia.4
The diffuse nature of climate change sources and damage, difficulties
in establishing cause and effect, and procedural barriers to international
jurisdiction5 make it unlikely that traditional international law courts,
1. See United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm,
Swed., June 5–16, 1972, princ. 21, Declaration of the United Nations on the Human
Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (1973) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].
This principle of Roman law, also known as the no-harm rule, is incorporated into
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration as:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the
principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources
pursuant to their environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
Id.
2. See Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1963, 1965 (1935)
(Int’l Joint Comm’n 1941). The International Joint Commission, after finding Canada
liable, initially found $350,000 in damages, id. at 1918, then found an additional $78,000
in damages, id. at 1933, and imposed a management and regulatory scheme to monitor
and enforce compliance, id. at 1966.
3. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7,
41–42 (Sept. 25) (citing Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 241–42 (July 8)).
4. The Court considered that “such ground for precluding wrongfulness can only
be accepted on an exceptional basis” and that “the state of necessity can only be invoked
under certain strictly defined conditions which must be cumulatively satisfied.” Id. at 40.
5. One of the greatest barriers to use of the International Court of Justice is nonsubmission to its jurisdiction by the US and China, the largest energy users and GHG
emitters and potentially the most vulnerable defendants. A list of the countries that have
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such as the ICJ, will be providing such balancing for climate change
issues in the near future. However, the obligations that most countries
have taken on in the climate change regime require adoption of national
energy policies that have significant impacts on international trade.
Because of this, climate change disputes are arising at the World Trade
Organization (WTO). Historically, the WTO dispute resolution system
provided a system for balancing contractual rights and obligations in
international trade.6 However, through the evolution of its purpose7 and
decisions on the compatibility of national environmental measures and
international trade law, it appears that the WTO dispute settlement body
has attempted to find ways to balance trade and environmental rights and
obligations affecting its members8 While this may lead us to assume that
decisions of WTO environmental jurisprudence are consistent in cases
with similar facts, the principles of stare decisis and precedent are not
principles of international law9 and as a result, there is still room for
inconsistent decisions at the WTO which may have effects on states’
policies, obligations and rights.
This article, therefore, draws attention to the different outcomes that
may result when WTO law is applied to resolve climate related national
energy policy disputes, signals this might send for national energy policies,
submitted the compulsory commission of the ICJ can be found on its website. Int’l
Court of Justice, Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory,
http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3 (last visited Oct. 18,
2012).
6. According to its preamble, the purpose of the GATT 1947, the precursor of the
WTO 1994, was the “substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the
elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce.” General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade pmbl., Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter
GATT].
7. The purpose is reflected in the context of the preambles of GATT 1947 as,
“[R]elations in the field of trade and economic endeavor should be conducted with a
view to raising standards of living . . . developing the full use of the resources of the world
and expanding the production and exchange of goods.” GATT, supra note 6, pmbl. In
contrast, the preambular context of the Marrakesh Agreement states the purpose as:
[R]elations in the field of trade and economic endeavor should be conducted
with a view to raising standards of living . . . expanding the production of and
trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world’s
resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking
both to protect and preserve the environment . . .
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization pmbl., Apr. 15, 1994,
1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement].
8. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 7, pmbl.
9. Gilbert Guillaume, The Use of Precedent by International Judges and Arbitrators,
2 J. INT’L DISPUTE SETTLEMENT No. 1, at 5, 14 (2011).
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and how a subtle effect of indirect state liability may arise. Several
pending or unresolved complaints currently at the WTO are used to
demonstrate these effects. The complaints include the greenhouse gas
controversy,10 the wind energy subsidies complaint,11 and the feed-in
tariffs complaint.12 The next section, Section II, presents the basic WTO
obligations of the four countries involved in these complaints (Japan,
Canada, USA, China), and ways that state liability can theoretically arise.
Section III explains, with some example cases, how the consistency of
national environmental policies with WTO laws has previously been
decided. Section IV explains the main energy-related obligations of the
countries under the international climate change regime. Section V
discusses those unresolved complaints in light of the countries’ WTO
and climate regime obligations. Finally, the article concludes by
demonstrating that the WTO not only has the power to change the
direction of countries’ energy policies, but its decisions may also lead to
indirect state liability.
It should be noted that this paper is not about the compatibility of
national energy policies with WTO law per se. Therefore there is no
exhaustive discussion of all analogous environmental compatibility
cases. Select cases are discussed only as indicators of WTO’s potential
to change national (energy) policies as well as to lead to a subtle and
indirect effect on state liability.
II. TRADE, ENERGY AND THE WTO
Global GDP growth is closely related to growth in energy (mainly oil)
production (Figure 1a).13 The percentage of global GDP associated with
global trade, including both imports and exports, has risen from less than
20% in the 1960s to more than 40% after 2000 (Figure 1b).14

10. See infra p. 216.
11. See Request for Consultations by the United States, China—Measures
Concerning Wind Power Equipment, WT/DS419/1 (Jan. 6, 2011), available at http://
www.worldtradelaw.net/cr/ds419-1(cr).pdf.
12. See Request for Consultations by Japan, Canada—Certain Measures Affecting
the Renewable Energy Sector, WT/DS412/1 (Sept. 16, 2010), available at http:// www.
worldtradelaw.net/cr/ds412-1(cr).pdf [hereinafter Feed-in Tariffs Request for Consultations].
13. See Gail Tverberg, Oil and the Economy: Why it is Important to Figure Out
Approximately Where We Are Headed, E NERGY B ULLETIN , fig.4 (Dec. 2, 2010),
http://www.energybulletin.net/stories/2010-12-02/oil-and-economy-why-it-importantfigure-out-approximately-where-we-are-headed.
14. See Merchandise Trade (% of GDP), THE WORLD BANK, available at http://
data.worldbank.org/indicator/TG.VAL.TOTL.GD.ZS/countries?display=graph (last visited
Sept. 28, 2011).

198

SILVA-SEND

2/29/2016 12:07 PM

[VOL. 4: 195, 2012-13]

Climate Change Disputes at the WTO
SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW

(a)

(b)

Figure 1: (a) Relationship between world GDP growth and growth in
energy production; (b) Global merchandise trade (imports and exports) as
percentage of global GDP.

After a dip during the recession years of 2008-2009, a continued increase in
this trade relationship may be expected.15 This expansion in global trade
itself raises many energy and climate related questions not discussed
here. One such question is how trade in environmental goods should be
liberalized,16 an issue that fits into the original framework of the preWTO General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which was
aimed towards the liberalization of global trade according to mutually
agreed contractual rules.17 This was to be accomplished by “ . . . developing
the full use of the resources of the world and expanding the production
and exchange of goods . . . ”18 The later development of GATT under the
Agreement Establishing the WTO in 1994, states that standards of living

15. This assumption is based on historical rates of GDP growth shown in Figure
1(b), as well as future expected growth in advanced economies, such as China. See
World Econ. Outlook: Growth Resuming, Dangers Remain, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND, 1, 2 tbl.1.1, 10 (April 2012), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
weo/2012/01/index.htm.
16. Discussions are on-going on the liberalization of trade in environmental goods
and services within the Doha Round. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial
Declaration of 14 November 2001, ¶ 31(iii), WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M 746 (2002)
[hereinafter Doha Declaration], available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/
min01_e/ mindecl_e.pdf.
17. See GATT, supra note 6, pmbl.
18. Id.
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should be raised through the production of, and trade in, goods and
services “ . . . while allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources in
accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both
to protect and preserve the environment . . . ”19 With this change toward
recognition of the importance of the environment, the WTO has become
more than a venue for mere trade liberalization. The WTO’s rules now
deeply affect any member state regulatory structure as to the trade of
goods, financial services, subsidies, and agriculture.20 There may also be
effects on domestic public health standards, conservation, the environment
and national development agendas.21 As national energy policies can
permit, restrict or enhance various types of carbon intense goods, as well
as the trade of those goods,22 world trade can thus have a large impact on
national energy and climate policies as well as greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions.
A. WTO Provisions Relevant to the Environment and by
Extension to Climate Change
Relevant to this article, the most important multilateral trade agreements
under the Agreement Establishing the WTO are the GATT, the Agreement
on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT),23 and the Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures Agreement (SCM).24 The members of the WTO have agreed
to the basic obligation of non-discrimination among equal partners,
expressed either as the most-favored-nation principle (MFN),25 or as the
national treatment principle.26 The non-discrimination principles are
expressed differently in each agreement, but the MFN principle basically

19. See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 7, pmbl.
20. A study on the effects of WTO accession on policies and reforms in transition
countries that have recently joined the WTO illustrates the issues. See Marc Bacchetta &
Zdenek Drabek, Effects of WTO Accession on Policy-making in Sovereign States:
Preliminary Lessons from the Recent Experience of Transition Countries 12 (WTO, Org.
Dev. and Econ. Research Div., Staff Working Paper No. DERD-2002-02, Apr. 2002),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/derd200202_e.htm.
21. See infra pp. 207–09 (exemplifying how countries may have to defend their
environmental policies).
22. For example, Japan’s national energy policy, which requires the most energy
efficient standards for goods in a class of goods, can act to restrict the import of the same
type of goods that are less energy efficient. See infra pp. 217–19.
23. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter
TBT].
24. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14
[hereinafter SCM].
25. GATT, supra note 6, art. I
26. Id. art. III.
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requires all trade concessions for a good given by state A, to an
equivalent good from state B, to be given immediately and unconditionally
to all WTO member states.27
National treatment means equal treatment between domestic and
imported like products with respect to taxes, charges, laws, regulations,
and requirements.28 There is a positive requirement to “accord treatment
no less than that accorded like products of national origin,”29 and a
negative requirement to not afford “protection to domestic production.”30
There is also a requirement to provide equality of competitive conditions
for imported products in relation to domestic products.31
The TBT further defines GATT Article III, subdivision (4), on the
“laws, regulations and requirements affecting [the] internal sale, offering
for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use [of products].”32
An example of a regulation that may act as a barrier to trade is a technical
standards barrier.33 Harmonizing this principle into international technical
standards is encouraged, and would be important to improve the efficiency
of production and facilitate international trade.34 Where international
standards exist, and few do,35 members must use them.36 National technical
regulations that meet certain conditions will be rebuttably presumed
consistent with this obligation.37 A national regulation with a significant
effect on international trade must be notified and published.38

27. Id. art. I, ¶ 1.
28. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities–Measures Affecting Asbestos
and Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 97, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter
Appellate Body Report, Asbestos Measures].
29. GATT, supra note 6, art. III, ¶ 2.
30. Id. art. III, ¶ 3(b).
31. Appellate Body Report, Asbestos Measures, supra note 28, ¶ 97.
32. GATT, supra note 6, art. III, ¶ 2.
33. Japan’s Top Runner Program, adopted under its 1979 Law for Rational Use of
Energy, is a good example of a technical barrier to trade. See infra pp. 217–19.
34. See TBT, supra note 23, pmbl.
35. See, e.g., Codex Alimentarius Comm’n, Codex Alimentarius (2011), http://www.
codexalimentarius.org/standards/en/. The Codex Alimentarius is one such codification
for food safety standards that is recognized by the WTO as an international standard in
the context of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. See
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Annex A, ¶ 3(a),
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493 [hereinafter SPS].
36. See TBT, supra note 23, art. 2.4.
37. Id. art. 2.5.
38. Id. arts. 2.9.1–2.9.2.
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Subsidies are a major policy instrument used by governments to promote
clean energy development.39 In the SCM a subsidy is defined as a
contribution by a government or a public body that also provides a
benefit and meets all the following criteria: (a) is direct, such as grants,
loans, or equity infusion, or potentially direct, such as loan guarantees,
or a liability such as a loan or guarantee;40 (b) is revenue foregone for
the government, for example, tax credits;41 (c) is a government
provision or purchase of goods or services other than infrastructure;
and (d) the benefit must be considered to be income or price support.42
Under the SCM, a subsidy can be prohibited, actionable, or nonactionable, and prohibited subsidies and actionable subsidies must be
shown to be specific to an enterprise or group of enterprises.43 A
prohibited subsidy is either contingent upon export performance or upon
the use of domestic versus imported goods.44 On the other hand,
actionable subsidies are those that either cause adverse effects to the
interests of other parties, or cause injury to the domestic industry, or nullify
or impair benefits conferred by tariff concessions, or cause serious prejudice
to party interests.45 Serious prejudice includes such effects as increasing
the world market share of the allegedly subsidized product as compared
to the average share it had in the previous 3 years.46
Whether national environmental regulations are allowed to stand
under the WTO depends to a large extent on the interpretation of the
exceptions permitted in each agreement. Thus GATT Article XX states
that as long as national measures “ . . . are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised
reaction on international trade, nothing in this agreement shall be construed
to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of
measures . . . (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health, or . . . (g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with
restrictions on domestic production or consumption.”47

39. See U.N. ENV’T. PROGRAMME, DIV. OF TECH., INDUS. AND ECON., REFORMING
ENERGY SUBSIDIES: OPPORTUNITIES TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE CLIMATE CHANGE AGENDA,
at 19, U.N. Sales No. 10.III.D.18 (2010).
40. See SCM, supra note 24, art. 1.1(a)(1)(i).
41. Id. art. 1.1(a)(1)(ii)
42. Id. art. 1.1(a)(1)(iii), (a)(2).
43. See SCM, supra note 24, arts. 2.1, 3–9.
44. Id. art. 3.1.
45. See id. art. 5.
46. Id. art. 6.3(d).
47. GATT, supra note 6, art. XX, ¶ I(b), (g).
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The national treatment exception is expressed differently in the TBT,
that technical regulations “ . . . are not prepared, adopted or applied with
a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to
international trade” and “ . . . shall not be more trade-restrictive than
necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective . . . ”48 Legitimate objectives
include the protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or
health, or the environment.49 In either agreement the underlying
principle when permitting national environmental regulations is to not
discriminate or create unnecessary obstacles to international trade.
There is no provision for environmental exceptions in the SCM.50
Whether subsidies are allowed to stand that protect the environment or
conserve resources when not more trade restrictive than necessary, is the
subject only of academic discussion.51 One author has suggested that
actionable subsidies can be subject to a GATT Article XX-type analysis.52
If so, provided the subsidy is related to environmental protection, is
necessary to protect humans and the environment and is applied in a nondiscriminatory manner, such actionable subsidies may be consistent with
WTO law.
It is relevant to note that the primary objective of a dispute settlement
ruling is to bring the inconsistent measure into conformance with the
relevant agreement.53 If this is impracticable, the temporary remedy of
compensation can be given.54 The WTO next provides for suspension of
concessions, also known as countermeasures, proportional to the
amount of impairment until nullification is removed, and subject to
authorization by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), and then as a last
step, provides for retaliation.55 Countermeasures are generally authorized

48. TBT, supra note 23, art. 2.2.
49. See id.
50. See generally SCM, supra note 24.
51. See Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of WTO Rules on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures 22–23 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. Inst. for Law and Econ.,
Working Paper No. 186, 2003) available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Publications/
Working/index.html.
52. See MARIE WILKE, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEV., FEED-IN
TARIFFS FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY AND WTO SUBSIDY RULES: AN INITIAL LEGAL REVIEW
20 (2011) available at http://ictsd.org/i/publications/112508/?view=document.
53. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
art. 19, ¶ 1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU].
54. See id. art. 22, ¶ 2.
55. See id. arts. 3, ¶ 7, 22.
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in the same sector as the violation but on occasion may be authorized in
non-related sectors. 56 The WTO itself does not impose the
countermeasures, but authorizes the plaintiff (trade-injured country)
to impose these countermeasures themselves.57 As remedies supported
under WTO law to re-adjust the trade rights and obligations, these
measures are not expected to affect state liability.
B. International State Liability
According to Charnovitz,58 “it was once possible to characterize the
GATT as a self contained contractual arrangement in which the rules of
state responsibility” did not apply.59 As Charnovitz further states, however,
the Appellate Body, in the Reformulated Gasoline case, stated “the DSU
reflects a measure of recognition that the General Agreement [on Tariffs
and Trade] is not to be read in clinical isolation from public international
law.”60 This leads to the conclusion that whenever the remedies authorized
could be considered “sanctions” the issue of responsibility or liability
does arise.61 Especially if and when countermeasures, especially as
cross-retaliation in sectors not associated with the violation, are authorized
to compel a state to comply with a previous “rebalancing order” (either
to remove the offending measure or be permitted to suspend concessions
granted) the responsibility-inducing effect of the remedy becomes more
clear.62 This paper suggests, however, an effect beyond the effect of
induced responsibility that can occur post WTO authorized remedial
measures, or even without WTO remedial measures at all, by showing
that, in the particular case where climate related energy policies are at
stake, a country can become liable through trade effects whether or not
trade remedies are authorized. This is especially significant because, more
than traditional national environmental regulations, energy policies are
the basis of development in any country.63 Thus, such trade effects

56. See id. art. 22, ¶ 3(a)-(b).
57. See id. art. 22, ¶ 3.
58. Steve Charnovitz, Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 792
(2001).
59. Id. at 793.
60. Id. at 793–94.
61. Id. at 805.
62. By using “sanctions” to induce compliance with a breach of WTO rules, a
WTO sanction can be considered a countermeasure that is taken to induce compliance
with international obligations. See Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 53d Sess., Apr. 23June 1, July 2-Aug. 10, 2001, art. 49, U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR 56th Sess., Supp. No.
10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 26, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SER.A/2001/Add.1.
63. See supra Figure 1(a).
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brought into global perspective as WTO disputes potentially have
significant effects on national development as well as climate protection.
In this paper, state liability is defined as economic or financial liability
arising from economic or financial damage caused not by intentional or
non-intentional breach of international obligations or unlawful act, but as
a result of implementation, in part, of international obligations undertaken
by the majority of countries for a greater public good, specifically, the
obligation to minimize damage to the climate necessarily through
national energy policies.
III. PAST RULINGS ON THE CONSISTENCY OF NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL MEASURES WITH WTO LAW
The DSB’s interpretation of what constitutes an environmental measure
and its compatibility with WTO law has evolved through a series of
environmental and natural resource cases described below.
Starting with the Herring-Salmon case in 1988,64 the Panel held that a
Canadian measure, adopted in part for conservation, prohibiting the
export of salmon and herring, was inconsistent with GATT and could
not be justified as an environmental measure because it was not
primarily concerned with conservation or protection.65 However, in the
Shrimp-Turtle case (1998), the AB rephrased this primary concern
requirement with a requirement that the measure need only relate to
conservation.66 Previously, in the Reformulated Gasoline case (1996),
the AB had clarified that even if a measure “. . . falls within the terms of

64. Report of the Panel, Canada—Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed
Herring and Salmon, L/6268-35S/98 (Nov. 20, 1987) [hereinafter Report of the Panel,
Unprocessed Herring and Salmon].
65. Id. at ¶ 4.6 (emphasis added).
The Panel concluded for these reasons that, while a trade measure did not have
to be necessary or essential to the conservation of an exhaustible natural
resource, it had to be primarily aimed at the conservation of an exhaustible
natural resource to be considered as ‘relating to’ conservation within the
meaning of Article XX(g) . . . A trade measure could therefore in the view of
the Panel only be considered to be made effective ‘in conjunction with’
production restrictions if it was primarily aimed at rendering effective these
restrictions.
Id.
66. Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, ¶ 142, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp AB
Report].
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Article XX (g) . . . ”,67 it must also be assessed for conformity with the
conditions of the Chapeau.68 For example, by not taking into account
whether other countries’ resource conservation policies were as effective
as US conservation policies, or by negotiating an international sea turtle
protection convention with Caribbean states to the exclusion of other
shrimp importing countries, the US had arbitrarily discriminated against
other countries.69
The Tuna-Dolphin cases (1991, 1994) clarified other requirements for
national environmental exceptions.70 In Tuna-Dolphin I, the US argued that
the ban on the import of tuna caught by fleets that did not exclude
dolphins under its Marine Mammal Protection Act (1972),71 could be
justified by GATT Article XX (b) and (g), due to its environmental and

67. Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, 22, WT/DS2/AB/R (April 29, 1996) [hereinafter Reformulated
Gasoline AB Report].
68. Id. The AB then explained how the chapeau should be applied:
In order that the justifying protection of Article XX may be extended to it, the
measure at issue must not only come under one or another of the particular
exceptions—paragraphs (a) to (j)—listed under Article XX; it must also satisfy
the requirements imposed by the opening clauses of Article XX. The analysis
is, in other words, two-tiered: first, provisional justification by reason of
characterization of the measure under XX(g); second, further appraisal of the
same measure under the introductory clauses of Article XX.
The chapeau by its express terms addresses, not so much the questioned
measure or its specific contents as such, but rather the manner in which that
measure is applied. It is, accordingly, important to underscore that the purpose
and object of the introductory clauses of Article XX is generally the prevention
of “abuse of the exceptions of [what was later to become] Article [XX].” This
insight drawn from the drafting history of Article XX is a valuable one. The
chapeau is animated by the principle that while the exceptions of Article XX
may be invoked as a matter of legal right, they should not be so applied as to
frustrate or defeat the legal obligations of the holder of the right under the
substantive rules of the General Agreement. If those exceptions are not to be
abused or misused, in other words, the measures falling within the particular
exceptions must be applied reasonably, with due regard both to the legal duties
of the party claiming the exception and the legal rights of the other parties
concerned.
Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
69. Shrimp AB Report, supra note 66, ¶¶ 163, 171.
70. For the U.S.-Mexico Panel Report of the dispute, see Panel Report, United
States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, WT/DS21/R (Sept. 3, 1991) [hereinafter Tuna
Dolphin Panel I Report]. For the U.S.-EEC Panel Report of the dispute, see Panel
Report, United States—Restrictions on Import of Tuna, WT/DS29/R (June 16, 1994)
[hereinafter Tuna Dolphin Panel II Report]. For a summary of the series of cases related
to this issue, see Mexico etc versus US: ‘tuna-dolphin’, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/edis04_e.htm (last visited October 1, 2012).
71. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361–1407 (2006).
The U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act was adopted on the basis of evidence that
human activities were in part causing the depletion to below sustainable population
levels of various marine mammals. See id. § 1361(1).
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conservation objectives.72 However, the Panel stated that if the measure
applied extra-territorially, and if each contracting party were to apply its
own conservation policies outside its jurisdiction, then other states’ trade
rights would be affected.73 Thus the Panel rejected the extra-territorial
application of Article XX (b) and (g).74
In Tuna-Dolphin II, a US measure banned the import of processed
tuna from countries that did not ban the import of tuna caught by a
method that did not exclude dolphins.75 This secondary nation embargo
was challenged by the EEC and the Netherlands.76 Consistent with its
previous Tuna-Dolphin decision, the Panel found that a measure could
not be distinguished on the basis of its method of production, and that a
state had extra-territorial jurisdiction, at most, only upon its own
nationals.77 A conservation measure applied extra-territorially would only
work by forcing the other countries to change their policies, a violation of
the sovereignty of states, and trade measures could not be used to protect
domestic producers required to achieve higher environmental standards
(and therefore only able to sell at higher prices).78 Further, the secondary
trade embargo was considered not necessary to protect dolphins, as there
were reasonable alternatives.79
Though not adopted, the Tuna-Dolphin rulings’ non-distinction of a
product on the basis of its production method can have repercussions for

72. See Tuna Dolphin Panel I Report, supra note 70, ¶¶ 5.24, 5.30.
73. Id. ¶ 5.32.
74. Id. ¶ 5.32.
75. See Tuna Dolphin Panel II Report, supra note 70, ¶ 2.12 (“[A]ny nation
(“intermediary nation”) that exports yellowfin tuna or yellowfin tuna products to the
United States, and that imports yellowfin tuna or yellowfin tuna products that are subject
to a direct prohibition on import into the United States, must certify and provide
reasonable proof that it has not imported products subject to the direct prohibition within
the preceding six months.”).
76. Id. ¶ 3.3 (stating that “[t]he EEC and the Netherlands claimed that the
measures taken by the United States under the intermediary nation embargo were a
quantitative restriction of tuna and tuna products that was prima facie contrary to Article
XI:1 of the General Agreement.”).
77. Id. ¶ 5.17.
78. See id. ¶¶ 5.26–5.27 (emphasis added).
If however Article XX were interpreted to permit contracting parties to take
trade measures so as to force other contracting parties to change their policies
within their jurisdiction, including their conservation policies, the balance of
rights and obligations among contracting parties, in particular the right of
access to markets, would be seriously impaired.
Id.
79. Id. ¶ 5.35.
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national climate and energy policies having cross border effects. For
example, electricity produced by renewable energy, a potentially desirable
outcome in terms of greenhouse gas emissions, could not be distinguished
from electricity produced by conventional fossil fuels, and, according to
the logic of Tuna-Dolphin I and II, could not be used to justify an
environmental exception. In the Shrimp-Turtle case (1998), with facts
nearly identical to the Tuna-Dolphin cases, regarding a US measure to
conserve endangered turtles by banning the import of shrimp caught by a
method that did not protect turtles,80 the Panel considered the ban
measure a Product Process Measure (PPM), and thus an unpermitted
quantitative restriction that was prima facie discriminatory.81 The AB
reversed this interpretation, however, and stated that while all domestic
measures, even if a PPM, were unilateral measures that tried to impose on
others, they may still be justifiable under Article XX82 provided the measure
then passes all the requirements of the Chapeau.83 While there is a marked
preference for internationally negotiated solutions to regional and global
environmental problems, as stated in this case and in the WTO rules, it
would appear that under such narrow conditions, certain domestic
measures, whether product related or a product production measure, related
to, but not necessarily primarily aimed at conservation or environmental
protection, may have extra-territorial application, and may have priority over
international trade rights.
The Automobile Fuel Efficiency case provides an example of what
can happen even when a WTO panel ruling is not adopted or appealed.84

80. Panel Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, ¶ 7.11, WT/DS58/RW (June 15, 2001) [hereinafter Shrimp Panel
Report].
81. Id. ¶ 7.49.
82. See Shrimp AB Report, supra note 66, ¶ 187(c).
83. Id. ¶¶ 173–74.
84. Post 1994, the adoption of Panel Reports takes place automatically unless
rejected by consensus. The chance of rejection by consensus is basically non-existent as
the injured state is never expected to reject. According to the WTO website:
One Member opposing the adoption of the report is not sufficient, nor is a
majority; instead, what is needed to reject (or not to adopt) the panel report is a
consensus against adoption by all Members represented at the relevant DSB
meeting. In other words, one single Member insisting on adoption is sufficient
in order to secure the adoption of the report. Normally, at least one party has
an interest in the adoption because, overall, it prevailed with the panel. Even if
many panel decisions are mixed in that not all the claims of violation of
(WTO) law succeed, there is usually a “winner” (the complainant, if at least
one claim is upheld, and the respondent, if all are dismissed) and a “loser” in
the formal sense. Because the prevailing party has a natural interest in having
the panel’s conclusions become binding upon the parties, the adoption of panel
reports is “quasi-automatic”. Thus, rejection by (negative) consensus is more
theoretical than real, and has never occurred in the WTO practice to date.
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This case arose from litigation against the US Corporate Average Fuel
Efficiency (CAFE) standards under the US Energy Policy Conservation
Act of 1975, adopted in part for national security and in part to conserve
energy.85 The CAFE standards required the average fuel-efficiency of
all U.S. and foreign manufactured and imported cars to not fall below a
given level.86 Many European manufacturers met the CAFE standards in
the 1970s and early 1980s, but later shifted to a strategy of exporting
more profitable, less fuel-efficient luxury cars to the US, voluntarily
choosing not to comply with the CAFE standards and, as a result, paid
substantial penalties under the national law.87 In 1993, Europe challenged
the CAFE standards under GATT, claiming that the standards had a
negative impact on European manufacturers.88 The Panel upheld the
challenge, ruling that the measure violated GATT non-discrimination
rules, even if there was a non-discriminatory intent.89 Despite the fact
that the ruling was neither adopted nor appealed, the main implication of
this ruling is that if a national rule concerning energy policy for multiple
objectives, including environmental protection, is not discriminatory in
intent, a party that chooses not to comply with it and then suffers the
trade consequences can claim discriminatory effect. This could create an
incentive for foreign firms in any country to violate national regulations
designed at least in part to protect the environment, and then claim injury
under the WTO. The practical effects of this complaint on GHG mitigation
were negative as European manufacturers chose to pay the CAFE
penalties for 27 years, rather than comply with US environmental

See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM TRAINING MODULE:
CHAPTER 6, § 6.4, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement
_cbt_e/c6s4p1_e.htm.
85. The Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards (CAFE) were enacted under
the National Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, revised by the Energy
Independence and Security Act of 2007. See Energy Policy and Conservation Act of
1975, PL 94–163, 89 Stat. 871 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6201 (2000)). The
statement and purpose of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 provides: “(4)
to conserve energy supplies through energy conservation programs, and, where
necessary, the regulation of certain energy uses; (5) to provide for improved energy
efficiency of motor vehicles, major appliances, and certain other consumer products.” Id.
86. 49 U.S.C. § 32,902 (2007).
87. Auto manufacturers were subject to fines according to the CAFE Regulations.
49 U.S.C. § 32,912 (2007).
88. Panel Report, United States—Taxes on Automobiles, ¶ 3.220, WT/DS31/R
(Oct. 11, 1994) [hereinafter Automobile Fuel Efficiency Panel Report].
89. Id. ¶ 6.1.
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standards.90 In addition, the US agency with jurisdiction to increase the
CAFE penalty chose not to so that neither production nor import of these
vehicles were discouraged.91 In the final analysis, the (un-adopted)
decisions of this complaint can be considered unsatisfactory as a
mechanism for environmental benefits, and puts into doubt the alleged
environmental and national security goals of the regulation.
For climate related energy policies, which may be considered
extensions of environmental policies, the sum of the cases described
above indicates the variety of outcomes possible at the WTO. Recall
that international law decisions, such as WTO DSB rulings, are not
subject to the principle of stare decisis.92 Thus, each case with similar
facts may be decided in unpredictable ways. There is also a small
chance that a Panel Report may be adopted without appeal. On the
other hand, the Shrimp-Turtle case seems to indicate a small opening
for national environmental, including climate-energy, policies, to be
justified as a GATT Article XX exception.
IV. OBLIGATIONS OF COUNTRIES UNDER THE
CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME
The main objective of the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) is to prevent dangerous human interference with the
climate.93 Canada, China, Japan and the US were original signatories
and ratified the Convention in 1994.94 All parties, taking into account
their common but differentiated responsibilities, and national development
90. By November 2010, European auto manufacturers had paid $794,921,139.50
in penalties since 1983. See Summary of CAFE Fines Collected, Nat’l Highway Traffic
Safety Admin. (Nov. 29, 2010), http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf/cafe/
CAFE_fines_collected_summary.pdf. Only in 2009, after paying fines for over 10 years,
did the largest of EU CAFE standard violators, Mercedes-Benz, Inc., announce that it
would now introduce models that would comply with the regulations and avoid the large
fines they had been paying as well as in anticipation of future more drastic MPG
standards in the USA. John O’Dell, Mercedes Says Its Annual CAFE Fines Are a Thing
of the Past, AUTOOBSERVER.COM (Mar. 12, 2010), http://www.autoobserver.com//2010/03/
mercedes-says-its-annual-cafe-fines-are-a-thing-of-the-past.html.
91. The original penalty was $50 per vehicle for every 1 mpg shortfall. This was
raised to $55 in 1997 with no changes since. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-07-921, VEHICLE FUEL ECONOMY: REFORMING FUEL ECONOMY STANDARDS COULD
HELP REDUCE OIL CONSUMPTION BY CARS AND LIGHT TRUCKS, AND OTHER OPTIONS
COULD COMPLEMENT THESE STANDARDS (Aug. 2, 2007), available at http://www.gao.
gov/products/GAO-07-921.
92. Guillaume, supra note 9, at 14.
93. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, May 9,
1992, S. Treaty Doc No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC].
94. Status of Ratification of the Convention, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/
status_of_ratification/items/2631.php (last visited Oct. 17, 2011).
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priorities, must inventory their anthropogenic emissions and sinks using
agreed upon best scientific methods, and formulate and implement
programs to mitigate climate change.95 The Annex I parties96 have
committed to adopting national policies to limit anthropogenic GHG
emissions and protect and enhance GHG sinks.97 Annex I parties must
aim to return to 1990 levels.98 This is the most explicit substantive
commitment beyond the obligations for all parties.99 Developing countries’
(non-Annex I) implementation of obligations depends on the Annex I
parties’ commitment to finance and transfer technology.100
All parties must therefore implement climate change mitigation
policies as well as be guided by the principle that there be a “supportive
and open international economic system[,]” and that measures taken to
combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction
on international trade.”101 This provision harmonizes the UNFCCC with
the non-discrimination principles of the WTO. But how this provision
works in practice, with the very different substantive requirements
undertaken by each country to reduce traditional energy use and GHGs,
is far from obvious and clearly needs to be developed. All countries
must take unilateral action under the UNFCCC, which can have a de facto
discriminatory effect on trade, as will be seen below. The UNFCCC
itself does not address the effects of non-compliance, although the preamble
refers to the no-harm principle.102
The Kyoto Protocol103 further requires Annex I states to “. . .
individually or jointly, ensure that their aggregate anthropogenic carbon
dioxide equivalent emissions of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A
do not exceed their assigned amounts given in Annex B . . . with a view
to reducing their overall emissions of such gases by at least 5 per cent

95. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change art. 4(1), Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
96. The Annex I parties are all the EU countries, Australia, Belarus, Canada,
Croatia, the European Economic Community, Japan, New Zealand, Russian Federation,
Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States. UNFCCC, supra note 93, annex I.
97. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 95, art. 4(2).
98. Id. art. 4(2)(b).
99. Id.
100. UNFCCC, supra note 93, art. 4(3).
101. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 95, art. 3(5).
102. See UNFCCC, supra note 93, pmbl., § 8.
103. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 95.
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below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012.”104 Under
this scheme, Japan has committed to a 6% reduction of greenhouse gases
below 1990 levels, and Canada to an average 6% decrease below 1990
levels.105 The US as an original signatory but not a member of the Kyoto
Protocol has not taken on specific quantitative reduction targets.106
China, a non-Annex I party, was an original signatory and ratified the
Protocol, with concurrent obligations for non-Annex I parties. 107
To meet their obligations under the Kyoto Protocol, Annex I parties
must implement measures listed non-exhaustively in Article 2, such as:
“(i) Enhancement of energy efficiency in relevant sectors of the national
economy; (iv) . . . promotion, development and increased use of, new
and renewable forms of energy, of carbon dioxide sequestration
technologies . . . ; and (vii) Measures to limit and/or reduce emissions of
greenhouse gases . . . in the transport sector.”108 All parties must
“[f]ormulate, implement, publish and regularly update national and,
where appropriate, regional programmes containing measures to mitigate
climate change . . . “where “[s]uch programmes would, inter alia,
concern the energy, transport and industry sectors as well as agriculture,
forestry and waste management.”109
Therefore, with or without the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, the
climate regime requires that all member states adopt measures on energy
efficiency and alternative energy as principle measures to mitigate climate
change. These measures affect nearly all sectors of the local, regional,
national and global economy.110 For example, China, as a non-Annex I
state, while it does not commit to quantifiable GHG reductions by 2012,
or aim to achieve 1990 levels at some unspecified date, is nonetheless
obliged to formulate and implement climate change mitigation measures
concerning energy, transport and industry, among others. The obligations
of China under the climate regime appear to be somewhat less onerous,
and largely in terms of procedural requirements, than those of the US.
The US, as only an Annex I UNFCCC member, must “only” aim to
achieve 1990 levels by an unspecified date. The practical difference
104.
105.

Id. art. 4(2)(b).
Kyoto Protocol Targets, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/3145.php (last visited Oct. 17,
2011).
106. Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/
items/2613.php (last visited Oct. 17, 2011).
107. Id.
108. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 95, art. 2(1)(a).
109. Id. art. 10.
110. As energy and GDP are closely related. Merchandise Trade, supra note 14;
see also supra Figure 1(a).
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between “aim to achieve 1990 levels” and “must adopt measures to
mitigate” is arguably negligible. In effect, the substantive international
climate change obligations for the US, as an Annex I party, and China as
a non-Annex I party, appear to be similar.
The UNFCCC has no provision or mechanism to address the benefits
of the consequences of countries’ climate-related energy policies with
trade and development goals.111 For all countries, a lower carbon future
requires switching from fossil fuel sources to less carbon intense energy
sources. Additionally, becoming more energy efficient requires increasing
the energy efficiency of goods and services. To happen quickly, both of
these major developmental changes require large investment. The general
practices for these purposes are government intervention through financial
mechanisms such as subsidies,112 as well as command and control
mechanisms such as energy efficiency standards for goods. But what
happens when some states create standards for globally traded products
that are significantly more energy efficient than others? Must all other
countries producing equivalent goods reach the same energy efficiency
standards or might those states that are producing more energy efficient
goods be forced to lower those standards due to the potentially negative
effects on global trade? In other words, what is the effect on global
trade when countries that are not obliged to do so under the international
climate change regime subsidize clean energy industries or may even be
permitted to raise their levels of energy use and emissions?113 Can such
countries’ energy policies flood the global market with cheaper clean
energy goods—an environmentally desirable situation—and become
internationally liable for the effects on the global trading system?
V. UNRESOLVED NATIONAL ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY
COMPLAINTS AT THE WTO AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
The potential effects of WTO resolution of climate related energy
policies can be illustrated through analysis of three existing unresolved
complaints. The Greenhouse Gas Controversy is an older energy policy
111. The only provision relating climate policies and international trade is a nondiscrimination provision. See UNFCCC, supra note 93.
112. The Global Revival of Industrial Policy: Picking Winners, Saving losers, THE
ECONOMIST, Aug. 5, 2010, available at http://www.economist.com/node/16741043.
113. Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol provides member states’ allowable emissions.
Iceland, for example, was permitted to raise its emissions within the compliance period
by 10 %. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 95, annex B.
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based complaint114 that provides a useful example to assess what the
outcomes may look like should it be re-activated or similar complaints
arise. In 1999, the EU and the US (acting on behalf of Ford and
Daimler-Chrysler) threatened WTO action against the Japan’s Top
Runner Program adopted under its 1979 Law for the Rational Use of
Energy, and revised in main part to fulfill Japan’s Kyoto Protocol
obligations.115 The Top Runner Program established energy efficiency
standards for a variety of products, including medium-weight automobiles,
and has been proven to be the most effective globally to meet the multiple
objectives of reduction of fuel imports, climate change mitigation and
cost effectiveness.116 Thus, Mitsubishi Motors produced the most fuel
efficient and lowest GHG emitting cars, whereas 90% of the mediumweight imports were of EU/US origin, which would have to reach the
efficiency standards met by Mitsubishi by a given date or face penalties.117
The EU/US complained that this measure was unnecessarily traderestrictive under the TBT.118
A second complaint was received in September 2010 when Japan
requested consultations with Canada119 regarding Ontario’s measures
relating to domestic content requirements in the Feed-in Tariff Program
(FIT Program). Japan has claimed that the measures are inconsistent
with Canada’s obligations under GATT Article III because “they appear
to be laws, regulations or requirements affecting the internal sale, offering
for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution, or use of equipment for
renewable energy generation facilities that accord less favorable treatment
to imported equipment than the treatment accorded to like products
originating in Ontario.”120 Japan also alleges the measures could be internal
quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of a
specified amount or proportion of equipment for renewable energy

114. Peter Constantini, What’s Wrong With the WTO? WTO Controversies,
SPEAKEASY.ORG (Nov. 2001), http://www.speakeasy.org/~peterc/wtow/wto-cont.htm.
115. Act Concerning the Rational Use of Energy, Act No. 49 of 1979, art. 1–3
(Japan).
116. In recognition of the effectiveness of this program, Germany’s new 2011
energy strategy will seek to emulate that for products in Germany. Der Weg zur Energie
der Zukunf –sicher, bezahlbar und umweltfreundlich, B UNDESMINISTERIUM FUR
WIRTSCHAFT UND TECHNOLOGIE, http://www.bmu.de/energiewende/doc/47465.php (last
updated June 6, 2011).
117. Constantini, supra note 114.
118. Bruce Barnard, European Carmakers to Challenge Japan at WTO, THE
JOURNAL OF COMMERCE (Dec. 21, 1998, 7:00 PM), http://www.joc.com/maritime-news/
european-carmakers-challenge-japan-wto_19981221.html.
119. Canada–Measures Relating to the Feed-in-Tariff Program, World Trade
Organization, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds426_e.htm
(last visited Mar. 15, 2013).
120. Id.
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generation facilities, be supplied from Ontario sources.121 Japan argues
that this affords protection to Ontario production of such equipment,
contrary to the non- discrimination principles of GATT.122 Japan has
further alleged that the measure is a prohibited subsidy as a financial
contribution or a form of income or price support, and a benefit is
thereby conferred that appears to be provided “contingent . . . upon the
use of domestic over imported goods” under Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2 of
the SCM Agreement.123
A third complaint was brought in December 2010 by the US against
Chinese wind energy subsidies based on a petition by the United
Steelworkers to the US government for WTO action.124 This complaint
alleged that actionable subsidies in China125 to promote their domestic

121. Id.
122. Id.
123. As of August 2011, the European Union has also requested consultation with
Canada on Measures Relating to the Feed-in-Tariff program. Id.
124. See United Steelworkers’ Section 301 Petition Demonstrates China’s Green
Technology Practices Violate WTO Rules, UNITED STEELWORKERS, http://assets.usw.
org/releases/misc/section-301.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2013) [hereinafter U.S. Steelworkers’
Complaint] (only the Executive Summary of the reported 5,800 page long United
Steelworkers 301 Petition is available). Based on the Petition, the United States Office
of the Trade Representative launched an investigation on October 15, 2010 that ended in
December 22, 2011 with the complaint submitted to the WTO. See United States
Launches Section 301 Investigation into China’s Policies Affecting Trade and Investment
in Green Technologies, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Oct.
2012), http://www.ustr.gov/node/6227.
125. China adopted its national energy and climate strategy as part of its 12th Five
Year Plan on March 2011 with targets to reduce energy intensity (16% reduction by
2015 of 2005 level, 40-45% by 2020) and CO2 emissions per unit GDP (17% reduction
by 2015). In its 2009 Renewable Energy Law, which took effect in April 2010, China
authorized feed-in tariffs for on-shore wind based on geographical wind distribution, and
biomass and set a target of 100 Gigawatts of wind power capacity by 2020. The lowest
wind tariff is RMB0.51/kWh (7.5 US cents/kWh) for the best wind resources of Inner
Mongolia and parts of Xinjiang. The rates decrease to RMB0.54/kWh (7.9 US
cents/kWh), RMB0.58/kWh (8.5 US cents/kWh) and RMB0.61/kWh (9.0 US cents/kWh
with decreasing wind strength). The tariff for biomass now is RMB0.35/kWh (5.2 US
cents/kWh). In 2006, China increased to 15% the target share of renewables, including
nuclear, in its final energy consumption, up from the previous 8% target. See Deborah
Seligsohn & Angel Hsu, China Releases 12th Five Year Plan, SUSTAINABLE BUSINESS,
http://www.sustainablebusiness.com/index.cfm/go/news.display/id/22006 (last updated
Mar. 8, 2011); see also Renewable Energy Law of the People’s Republic of China
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l Peoples Cong., Feb. 28, 2005, effective Jan.
1, 2006), ST. COUNCIL GAZ. Issue 11, Serial No. 1154 (China), translated at
http://www.ccchina.gov.cn/en/NewsInfo.asp?NewsId=5371 [hereinafter REL 2006],
amended by Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on
Amending the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Renewable Energy
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renewable energy industry have injured the US steel industry and
associated industries by displacing US wind industry component exports
to China by 67%–81% and to the EU by 30%.126 For solar cells and
panels, such subsidies are alleged to have caused the global price to drop
by 40%, China to achieve 34% market share in the EU, displacing the
US share of exports to the EU to 3.7%.127 Moreover, the subsidies are
alleged to have caused US panel makers to shift production to China in
2009 and 2010, leading to national economic losses.128
A. Potential Solutions, Signals for National Energy Policies and
International Liability
How may these complaints be resolved at the WTO and what signals
do they send for national climate related energy policies? Applying the
reasoning of the Automobile Fuel-Efficiency Case to the GHG
Controversy for example, the DSB could find that the measure, despite
its probable motive to protect the climate, or its likely non-discriminatory
intent, has negative trade consequences, or is in effect discriminatory,
specifically towards EU auto manufacturers, and thus fails GATT Article
XX tests. Alternatively, or in addition, the measure may be found unnecessarily trade restrictive under the TBT. The measure may need to
be withdrawn, made less stringent in terms of emissions standards, or
applied differently.129 If Japan were to withdraw or lower its energy
efficiency standards, the EU, through the WTO, would be forcing Japan
to change its climate protective energy policies. A second possible
outcome for an un-necessarily trade restrictive measure under the TBT
would be for Japan to cooperate with the EU and US importers, assisting
them to achieve compliance.130 This is costly and time consuming for

(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26,2009, effective Apr.
1, 2010), 2009 China Law LEXIS 671 (China) [hereinafter Amended REL 2009]; see
also Eric Martinot & Li Junfeng, Renewable Energy Policy Update for China,
RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD (July 21, 2010), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/
rea/news/article/2010/07/renewable-energy-policy-update-for-china.
126. See Matthew L. Wald & Keith Bradsher, 4 U.S. Makers of Towers for Wind
Turbines File Complaint Over China’s Steel Subsidies, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2011, at
B2.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See Shrimp AB Report, supra note 66, ¶¶ 172, 186 (countries must respect the
rights of other member states and seek to consult and negotiate a regional or international
solution to transboundary environmental issues).
130. Id. ¶ 168. Under this interpretation, Japan would most likely have to seriously
seek to negotiate international technical standards, or seek to harmonize their national
technical standards with those of other countries.
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Japan, making Japan indirectly liable for its stronger climate related
energy policies.
Alternatively, if the measure could be considered more trade
restrictive than necessary, a different outcome would be for Japan to
ignore the ruling and pay fines to the EU and US as countermeasures
authorized to the latter by the WTO.131 Japan would become liable in
effect for international trade effects of its leading climate mitigation
regulations and again, a negative signal would be sent to climate
mitigating national energy policies worldwide.
In yet another possible outcome, Japan’s Top Runner efficiency
standards would be permitted to stand under international trade law.
Unless the EU/US met the standards within a given period of time, Japan
could either use domestic sanctions against the imports, or request sanctions
through the WTO countermeasure systems. Domestic sanctions over
many years, even if self-inflicted, do not necessarily lead to climate
mitigation.132 The EU/US, through trade losses and costs of meeting
higher environmental standards that in this case, the US did not sign up
for, may be forced to change their energy policies to meet higher
environmental standards. Meanwhile, Japan’s ability to meet its
international Kyoto obligations would be restricted. Therefore, regardless of
the ability of national energy policies to promote climate mitigation, the
DSB would have the power to change the direction of either parties’
national energy policies.
With no direct DSB guidance on the consistency of national subsidies
to promote environmentally protective measures, the potential outcomes
for resolution of the Feed-in Tariff (FIT) and the Subsidies for Wind
complaints are more speculative than for the GHG controversy based on
(energy efficiency) standards which clearly fall under the TBT or GATT. If
the Feed-In Tariffs are shown contingent on local content requirements
as alleged by Japan, this requirement for domestic content would be
sufficient to make at least parts of the FIT prohibited, if not the whole
FIT program, under the SCM. On the other hand, the FIT is labeled as a
program for government procurement and may fall outside of the SCM
altogether. Note that Japan is not complaining about the FIT program as
a whole. But establishing the existence of actionable subsidies in the
wind complaint is even more problematic under the narrower definition

131.
132.

See supra pp. 211–12.
See Reformulated Gasoline AB Report, supra note 67, at 21.
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of subsidies in the SCM. The subsidies must be shown to be
contributions by government to specific industries. Such contributions
would be actionable upon proof that either adverse effects or serious
harm is caused to the trading partner’s interests. Thus, the Steelworkers
Union has alleged that adverse effects and serious harm was caused to
the US wind and solar industry as well as depressed prices worldwide.
The WTO DSB may consider whether this harm is sufficiently serious
against the arguably environmentally desirable outcome that the
widespread use of low carbon energy the subsidies would cause. The
DSB may also attempt to balance a national energy policy implemented
largely for the development of a nascent Chinese industry, with large
global environmental co-benefits, and at least partly adopted to meet
UNFCCC obligations, against discriminatory behavior towards trading
partners.
Where subsidies are found to seriously injure or have adverse effects
on other members, their adverse effects must be removed within a
specified time. There are examples where both prohibited subsidies and
actionable subsidies have nonetheless been maintained, leading to large
sanctions through countermeasures. For example, in the Foreign Sales
Corporation (FSC) case,133 the US faced $4.3 billion in suspended tariff
concessions and other WTO obligations to the EU for failure to comply
with repeated AB decisions on prohibited subsidies (no taxes on exports
of US companies into the US). In the Upland Cotton case, which
spanned a period from 2002 to 2009, prohibited actionable subsidies on
cotton in the US that made cotton exceptionally cheap on the global
market and hurt Brazilian cotton producers, which were authorized
$294.7 million in concessions as well as additional TRIPS rights
suspensions worth more than $800 million.134 In August 2010, Brazil and
the US concluded an agreement in return for not imposing countermeasures
in the Upland Cotton case.135 These cases are indicative of situations
where the countermeasures and substantial fines are tolerated by the
violating state for subsidies. If such an approach were maintained by
China in the wind subsidies case, or Canada in the FIT case, we have a
situation not unlike the Automobile Fuel Efficiency case, where fines are
paid for trade violations, without environmental, climate and energy

133. United States–Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations”, WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds108_e.htm (last
visited Mar. 3, 2013).
134. See United States–Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds267_e.htm (last updated Sept.
21, 2010).
135. Id.
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resource benefits and possibly defeating the climate related policy goals
of national law.
The wind energy subsidies complaint was preliminarily resolved in
June 2011 at the consultation stage when China withdrew the controversial
measure.136 But not without repercussions: other US renewable energy
manufacturers have filed similar complaints with the US Department of
Commerce and the US International Trade Commission against Chinese
wind energy companies alleging subsidies leading to dumping prices.
These complaints can lead to similar new complaints by the US against
China at the WTO.137 In response to the uncertainty of how these
complaints will be handled, a Chinese solar energy company is reported
to have frozen solar installations in the US worth $500 million, affecting
US solar installers and developers who benefit from cheaper panels.138
As a matter of procedure, this SCM case based on allegations of
prohibited subsidies would be processed faster than the Feed-In Tariff
complaint related to actionable subsidies. The SCM provides for longer
time for reporting, appeal, and potential arbitration of actionable subsidies
than for prohibited subsidies.139 While this time lag could be a good thing
for climate benefits, especially in rapidly developing countries highly
dependent on petroleum, countries harmed in trade, in this case the US,
would have to contend with future trade losses unless the Chinese
provisions were removed.
It is ironic that, as stated in the US Steelworkers complaint, “From
2008 to 2009, U.S. demand for solar power grew by a healthy 41% . . .”140
This was likely due at least in part to the reported growth during this
time in low cost Chinese solar panels.141 From a climate change mitigation
perspective, a desirable scenario would be for low cost Chinese renewable
energy products to lead to a large uptake worldwide of renewable energy.
This would more rapidly promote the global conversion to a low carbon

136. China Ends Wind Power Equipment Subsidies Challenged by the United States
in WTO Dispute, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.
ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2011/june/china-ends-wind-power-equipmentsubsidies-challenged (last updated June 2011).
137. Wald & Bradsher, supra note 126.
138. Paul Jones, Chinese Solar Company Freezes Installations, L.A. DAILY JOURNAL,
Nov. 9, 2011, at 7.
139. SCM, supra note 26, art. 4.9.
140. See U.S. Steelworkers Complaint, supra note 124.
141. The complaint notes that panel imports from China nearly doubled in this
period. Id.
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economy. It can be argued that such WTO complaints by one or more
affected countries could be inducing China to breach globally desirable
substantive UNFCCC obligations, the very obligations China, and other
developing countries like China, have been accused of not having to
meet.142 Another possible outcome is that even the complaining state’s
uptake of cheaper alternative energy resources may be jeopardized in
favor of more expensive local products. However, even without specific
obligations under the UNFCCC regime, most countries, whether developed
or developing, large or small, have specific or general commitments under
the climate change regime.143 These countries look to each other for best
practices that promote energy efficiency and the movement towards a
globally lower carbon economy.144 They also employ similar policy and
regulatory mechanisms, sometimes in conjunctions with local content
rules, such as renewable energy targets, financial incentives, technical
efficiency standards, carbon taxes.145 Such national measures that affect
international trade may cause harm to the development and trading

142. See generally, e.g., STAFF OF H. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COM., 110TH CONG.,
CLIMATE CHANGE LEGIS. DESIGN WHITE PAPER: COMPETITIVENESS CONCERNING ENGAGING
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1–2 (Comm. Print 2008), available at http://www.fws.gov/
southeast/climate/policy/Climate%20Dingell%202nd%20White%0Paper%20Competitiv
eness%20013108.pdf.
143. See generally supra p. 19.
144. A widely used policy for rapidly increasing the uptake of renewable energy
share is the feed-in-tariff. Starting in the European Union, especially Germany’s successful
deployment, renewable energy is being touted globally and copied. See Ashley Seager,
Germany Sets Shining Example in Providing a Harvest for the World, THE GUARDIAN
(July 23, 2007), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2007/jul/23/germany.greenbusiness.
145. For example, India and the Ukraine have promulgated potentially prohibited
and actionable subsidies. For India, see Gov’t of India, Ministry of New and Renewable
Energy, Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission Towards Building SOLAR INDIA,
MINISTRY OF NEW AND RENEWABLE ENERGY, 3, http://www.mnre.gov.in/file-manager/
UserFiles/mission_document_JNNSM.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2013). India, with a
potentially very large solar energy market, has promulgated a law that solar modules
must be produced in India to gain FIT under the JNNSM. Abhishek Shah, Solar Energy
Protectionism–Italy Joins India, Canada in Formulating Domestic Content Requirements,
GREEN WORLD INVESTOR (May 10, 2011), http://www.greenworldinvestor.com/2011/
05/10/solar-energy-protectionism-italy-joins-indiacanada-in-formulating-domesticcontent-requirements/. This law is also expected to become stricter with future solar
cells produced in the country, drawing protest from the US, which has itself faced protest
for minimal domestic content rules in subsidies under the ARRA. See David T. Ralston,
Jr. & Jeffrey R. Blease, “Buy American” Provision in Stimulus Legislation Poses Serious
Compliance Challenges for Public Works Contractors and DHS Suppliers, FOLEY &
LARDNER LLP (Feb. 17, 2009), http://www.foley.com/buy-american-provision-in-stimuluslegislation-poses-serious-compliance-challenges-for-public-works-contractors-and-dhssuppliers-02-17-2009/. Ukraine became the latest country to include local content
requirements for feed-in-tariffs for renewable energy projects increasing domestic
content requirements over time. See Ukraine Stimulates Usage of Alternative Energy
Sources With Revised Green Tariff Rules, SQUIRE SANDERS (Apr. 2009), http://www.
ssd.com/ukraine_law_alert_april_2009/.
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interests of other states even without participation in the Kyoto Protocol,
as shown by the US complaints,146 or with stellar participation in the
Kyoto Protocol, as shown by the complaint against Japan.147 In the case
of China, signals are sent that promoting low carbon alternative energy
is not desirable in terms of international trade, and that China can become
indirectly liable for just those policies, even when environmentally
desirable. In the case of Japan, the most energy efficient products could
be shown to be similarly undesirable when traded globally, and Japan
may become liable for trading environmentally desirable goods. Canada,
by restricting international trade competition that is favorable to climate
protection, must now face potential international trade liability at the
WTO. Finally, the US, while pushing for environmentally desirable
outcomes in cases like Tuna-Dolphin, Shrimp Turtle, or Automobile Fuel,
must now decide what signals it wants for itself in terms of international
trade (non) liability by potentially resulting in fewer environmentally
desirable goods in the global market, but at the same time potentially
facing much greater responsibility in the future by contributing further
and decreasing the global potential to change to a lower carbon world.
Thus for all countries, participation in the WTO with implementation
of climate-energy policies becomes the basis for: (1) disputes that must
be resolved by balancing global climate concerns and international trade
law rights and duties; (2) resolution of disputes that signal the direction of
national climate-related energy policies; (3) state liability through trade
remedial measures; and (4) potentially longer-term state responsibility
for climate damage.
VI. CONCLUSION
In 2008 one observer wrote, “[i]n particular, with a US climate policy
in place, goods from countries without mandatory carbon restrictions—
such as China, Brazil or India—may gain a price advantage over US
goods. It is exactly this asymmetry that led the US Senate to reject the
146. E.g., Ben Lefebvre, EU Tariffs on US Biodiesel Spark Debate, ICIS.COM (Apr.
22, 2009), http://www.icis.com/Articles/2009/04/22/9209905/eu-tariffs-on-us-biodieselspark-debate.html (describing how the European Union applied antidumping duties in
2009 to U.S. biodiesel in reaction to subsidies for U.S. biofuel producers, which caused
the price of U.S biofuel to undercut European produced biofuel); see also Energy Policy
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (providing subsidies for U.S producers of
biofuels).
147. See generally Constantini, supra note 114.
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Kyoto Protocol. The competitiveness impact of US climate policy may
play out both at home (on the US market) and abroad (on world
markets).”148 However, contrary to this observer’s assumption that the
basis would be that the US has mandatory climate restrictions, and
China does not, has not turned out to be the case. The main argument
for US non-participation in the Kyoto Protocol, or similar obligations in
the future, becomes moot, as China, the largest developing country, has
also adopted national climate-related energy strategies. With China
entering the global renewable energy market in an aggressive way, Japan
at the forefront of energy efficiency goods, or other developed countries
taking protective local measures to develop their own nascent renewable
energy sectors, a competitive trading situation has arisen globally that
has sparked controversies at the WTO.
Though not excluding the possibility that climate change litigation
will arise through other international fora, this paper has shown that the
WTO has become a significant international venue to channel complaints
related to national climate-related energy regulations. The WTO thus
faces a challenging opportunity to grapple with and balance the national
regulation of climate change and international trade. Past DSB rulings
on environment and trade can have differing and inconsistent outcomes.
Similar inconsistencies are possible in cases related to climate change,
such as the greenhouse gas controversy (Japan/EU/US), the feed-in tariffs
complaint (Japan/Canada), and the wind subsidies complaint (US/China).
Depending on the outcome, countries may not have a trade advantage if
they promote energy policies based even partly on climate mitigation. In
addition the complainant or defendant could become liable for climate
change, either directly or indirectly, through WTO countermeasures,
national enforcement and penalties, or WTO authorized compensation.
Whether a party, or both parties, become indirectly liable for their
climate-related energy policies depends on whether the national energy
conserving or climate measure can be considered a GATT Article XX
exception, a TBT Article 2.2 exception, or it requires the complex task
of deciding on the acceptability of SCM subsidies under WTO law. To
note is that a complaining party need not have a direct legal interest to
bring a case to the WTO. If a member’s behavior could be shown to
affect another member’s rights, any member affected by a measure
would have a similar right to fight the measure.149

148. Joost Pauwelyn, U.S. Federal Climate Policy and Competitiveness Concerns:
The Limits and Options of International Trade Law 2 (Nicholas Inst. for Envtl. Policy
Solutions, Working Paper No. 07-02, 2007) (emphasis removed).
149. Andrea Bianchi & Lorenzo Gradoni, Developing Countries, Countermeasures
and WTO Law: Reinterpreting the DSU against the Background of International Law,
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The WTO has shown a willingness to attempt to balance trade and
environmental issues on a case-by-case basis and has the power to
mandate the direction of climate-related energy policy. Where a case
involves large energy consumers, such as the US or China, a WTO
decision can have significant global environmental effects. The WTO
has become a significant forum to achieve some progress where
international climate change negotiations have not. Although WTO
provisions and the DSB lend strong support for the preferential
development of global solutions, the DSB cannot wait for long-term
negotiated solutions when faced with immediate international trade
complaints based on national climate-related energy policies. At the
same time, the WTO has no prescribed mechanism to weigh the effects
of its decisions on a countries’ energy and climate policies, nor a duty to
observe precedent in their jurisprudence. Therefore, lacking negotiated
solutions to global energy and climate change issues, the effect of the
WTO’s decisions on national climate mitigating energy policies,
associated effects on global climate change mitigation, liability through
trade “sanctions,” and long term effects on state responsibility should be
closely watched.

ICTSD DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF INT’L TRADE (Int’l Ctr. for Trade
and Sustainable Dev., Geneva, Switzerland), Dec. 2008, at 13.
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